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ABSTRACT
united states ports along the coast of the
Gulf of Mexico are engaged in fierce competition
among themselves to attract existing and future
trade.
This competition has served to force moderni-
zation and expansion of facilities in all the
ports. The effort is running into the billions of
dollars and there are concerns that there is too
much duplication of costly facilities.
The Port of New Orleans benefits from its lo-
cation at the southern terminus of the Mississippi
River System. Until five years ago it was the
sole significant transhipment node between the na-
tion's midsection and its customers and suppliers.
In 1985, with the opening of the Tennessee-
Tombigbee Waterway, the Port of Mobile gained ac-
cess to the Mississippi River System and set out
to compete for trade that once had no alternative
transhipment point.
The unanswered question is whether or not the
investments being made to improve competitiveness
will prove to be resources well spent or waste-
fully dissipated. The answer may be cooperation
vice competition.
ii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine the
changes in the competitive factors between the
ports of New Orleans, Louisiana and Mobile, Ala-
bama. Change does exist since the opening of the
Tennessee-Tombigbee waterway in 1985 which puts
the Port of Mobile squarely in competition with
the Port of New Orleans for trade which relies
upon the Mississippi River Inland waterway System.
Successful competition on the part of any
port demands the presence of a port authority
capable of providing, at the very least; 1) suit-
able and adequate equipment and services, 2) ap-
propriate operational activities, 3) supporting
commercial/economic services, and 4) the encour-
agement ·o f correct personal attitudes through a
sound and fair labor policy. 1 Proper port devel-
opment and efficient operations are two areas of
interest requiring substantial investments by port
authorities that involve incurring long-term debts
to effect the changes necessary for a port to re-
main competitive.
In the past a port's interests could be tied
to its direct competition with neighboring ports.
Today such competition has expanded beyond the
individual port to pit region against region,
state against state; even seaboard against sea-
board. Remaining competitive in this ever growing
arena requires increasingly larger investments.
On the United states West Coast the realiza-
tion that cooperation between port authorities in
planning and operations could result in greater
efficiency and lowered investment costs resulted
in the preparation of state and regional port
systems studies that were joint efforts with the
Maritime Administration.
In California, San Francisco Bay regional
port authorities cooperated with the Metropolitan
Transportation Commission towards developing a
plan for the Bay Area. Additionally, through the
California Association of Ports Authorities
(CAPA), all California ports joined to develop a
maritime plan for the state.
A more ambitious study from the Northwest was
issued in 1975. That study, Port Systems Study
for the Public Ports of Washington State and Port-
land, Oregon, had as its primary objective:
2
(to)" ... develop a sound planning base on
which future policy decisions may be made
relative to the development and use of
public port facilities in2the state ofWashington and Portland."
A principal recommendation of that report was
that
"Coordination of individual port actions
in the future is the element necessary to
ensure mutually supportive port develop-
ments. -To effect such coordination, in-
dividual port authorities of the region
need a mechanism for making regional
port policy decisions and for guiding
future developments of the region's
ports.")
This paper views the ports of New Orleans and
Mobile under the light of the above recommenda-
tion. Further, it is the hypothesis of this paper
that the creation of a regional port authority, in
effect combining and controlling the operations
and future development of the two ports, would be
more beneficial than an all out competitive effort
resulting in a wasteful and expensive duplication
of facilities that could prove damaging to their
respective economies and ecologies.
In support of this hypothesis, the geography,
history of the area, port facilities, capital in-
vestment, transhipment capabilities and port ad-
ministrations are explored. This is followed by a
discussion of the developmental issues that impact
on seaports, in general. The final chapter pro-
vides insights into how the two ports have dealt
3
with pertinent developmental issues and draws con-
clusions.
Information for this paper has been gathered
from the respective port authorities, the United
states Maritime Administration and texts.
In general, developmental issues faced by
U.S. ports can be classified into four major
categories:
(a) decision-making on federal, regional,
and local levels;
(b) measures of national, regional, and
local requirements;
(c) institutional constraints; and
(d) use of shorelines. 4
The issue of institutional constraints, (c)
above, will not be discussed since institutional
constraints are artificial barriers subject to
amendment through government policy and/or public
requirements.
4
CHAPTER II
THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
Geography
The Port of New Orleans, Louisiana is posi-
tioned at the southern end of the Mississippi
River, centrally situated on the northern rim of
the Gulf of Mexico. Located in a subtropical
zone, it allows year-round access to the Missis-
sippi. The Port has long been the primary gate-
way to the heartland of North America. Long be-
fore any trails linked the central area of the
continent with the East Coast, commercial trade
and social intercourse flourished between commun-
ities along the Mississippi and its tributaries
and their counterparts in Northern Europe and
along the Mediterranean Sea. As the principal
shipping node between a vast hinterland and the
outside world, the Port of New Orleans grew in
wealth and importance. In many instances, the
history of New Orleans and the mighty Mississippi
River is the history of the United States.
Situated along the north bank of aU-shaped
bend on the Mississippi River, just before it
5
makes its final run into the Gulf, the Port of New
Orleans is the focal point of a 14,500-mile net-
work of .inland waterways.5 This network (see Fig-
ure 1) covers the central United states from the
Allegheny Mountains to the tabletop plains of
Oklahoma providing ingress and egress for the ag-
ricultural and industrial areas around such far-
flung places as Minneapolis, Omaha, Chicago, Cin-
cinnati and Knoxville to markets the world over.
In 1988 the Port had 3,787 vessel calls at its
Mississippi River wharves and Industrial Canal
Terminals. 6
Port Description
Today, the Port of New Orleans spreads along
22 miles of waterfront and offers 22,600,00 square
feet of cargo handling area. 7 Twenty-one termin-
als and wharves make up the Class "A" facilities
available for the loading and unloading demands of
modern commercial vessels. Listed in Table 1,
these facilities provide 23,135 feet (over four
miles) of waterfront with 2,454,594 square feet of
covered (shed) space and over 8.67 million square
feet of open handling area.
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TABLE 1
THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
(CLASS A BERTHS)
Facility Frontage Area Capabilities
Henry 842 ft L 95,020 ft 2 Shed General
Clay 62 ft W 170,858 ~t2 Open Area Containers
Wharf 154,125 ft Additional
Nashville 2,759 ft L 756,000 ft 2 Shed General
Avenue 62 ft W 110,000 ft 2 Open Area Containers
Wharf 463,000 ft 2 Additional
Napoleon 1,099 ft L 144,876 ft 2 Shed General
Avenue A 48 ft W 129,766 ft 2 Open Area Containers
and Napoleon A 97,844 ft 2 Additional
Open Wharf
Napoleon 762 ft L 100,381 ft 2 Shed Steel
Avenue B 108 ft W 36,521 ft 2 Open Area Breakbulk
Wharf 57,991 ft 2 Additional
Napoleon 1,000 ft L 199,859 ft 2 Shed Steel
Avenue C 48 ft W 28,313 ft 2 Open Area Breakbulk
Wharf 22,903 ft 2 Additional
Napoleon 375 ft L 118,420 ft 2 Open Area Breakbulk
Avenue C Open 36,300 ft 2 Additional Containers
Wharf
Milan st 1,263 ft L 107,081 ft 2 Shed 12 ft draft
Wharf 31 ft W 65,000 ft 2 Additional
Louisiana 1,590 ft L 48,915 ft 2 Shed Containers
Avenue (E) 150 ft W 178,360 ft 2 Open Area
E & F (F) 48 ft W 92,486 ft 2 Backup Area
Wharves 1 ,221 ,243 ft 2 Additional
Harmony st 1,089 ft L 135,653 ft 2 Shed Steel
Wharf 49 ft W 104,380 ft 2 Open Area
Seventh st 1 ,196 ft L 119,280 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf 50 ft W 134,911 ft 2 Open Area Containers
First st 1,275 ft L 140,655 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf 50 ft W 99,440 ft 2 Open Area
8
TABLE 1
THE PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
(CLASS A BERTHS)
(CONT)
Facility Frontage Area Capabilities
Governor 1,210 ft L
Nichols st 30 ft W
Wharf
156,617 ft~ Shed
37,694 ft Open Area
Containers
General
Poland Ave 932 ft L
Wharf Berths 35 ft W
4 & 5
84,328 ft 2 Shed
96,257 ft 2 Open Area General
Alabo st 1,313 ft L
Wharf 81 ft W
France Rd 830 ft L
Container 147 ft W
Terminal #1
125,310 ft 2 Shed General
182,821 ft 2 Open Area Containers
67,019 ft 2 Shed Containers
1.46 M ft 2 Marshall Area
France Rd 700 ft L
Container 120 ft W
Terminal #4
1 Mil. ft 2 Marshall Area Containers
RO-RO
Containers
ContainersMarshall Area
Shed
Shed
Shed
Open Area
Marshall Area
ft 2
ft 2
ft 2
ft 2
ft 2
ft 2
142.400
157,413
435,600
1,700 ft L 2.10 M
(5) 31,200
(6) 100,000
Jourdan Rd 1,400 ft L
Terminal 70 ft W
France Rd
Container
Terminals 5 & 6
N Orleans 1,800 ft L
Bulk Terminal
-3 Berths-
30,000 ton Covered Pad
750,000 ton Open Pad
Bulk
Source: Port of New Orleans
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Additionally, the Public Bulk Terminal has a
750,000 ton open storage pad and a 30,000 ton
covered storage pad.
Transportation Services
Over 100,000 barges transit the Port each
year carrying both traditional bulk (grain, petro-
leum, coal) and general cargos (steel, plywood,
timber, paper, cotton). Half of all U.S. grain
exports are shipped from the ten grain elevators
in the lower Mississippi River region. 8
Trucks hauling goods in and out of the Port
of New Orleans have easy access to Interstate
Highway 10 running east-west through the city.
North-south truckers have direct connections to
Interstate Highways 55 and 59. As can be seen in
Figure 2, these routes allow trucks to reach any
point in North America.
The Port's central location has attracted six
mainline railroads; CSX Transportation, Kansas
City Southern, Illinois Central, Norfolk Southern
Corp., Southern Pacific Co., and Union Pacific.
Figures 3 through 8 depict the far reaches of
these railway systems. The major advantage of
having so many railroads is minimizing delays by
avoiding time-consuming interchanges for cars
caught on another company's tracks. These six
10
FIGURE 2
INTERSTATE CONNECTIONS
1-59/20 North/East
A. New Orleans
L. Meridian
M. Birmingham
N. Atlanta-and the
Southeast
I-59 Northeast
A. New Orleans
L. Meridian
M. Birmingham
O. Chattanooga-
and the
Northeast
I-55 North
A. New Orleans
U. Jackson
v. Memphis
W. st Louis
x. Peoria
Y. Chicago
1-59/65/69 North
A. New Orleans
L. Meridian
M. Birmingham
P. Nashville
Q. Louisville
R. Indianapolis
S. Lansing
T. Sault Ste Marie
1-10 West
A. New Orleans
B. Baton Rouge
C. Houston
D. San Antonio
E. El Paso
F. Las Cruces
G. Tucson
H. San Diego
1-10 East
A. New Orleans
I. Mobile
J. Tallahassee
K. Jacksonville
1 1
FIGURE 3
CSX RAIL CONNECTIONS
A. New Orleans 1. Knoxville Q. Buffalo
B. Mobile J. Memphis R. Baltimore
C. Tallahassee K. St. Louis S. Philadelphia
D. Jacksonville L. Indianapolis T. Washington
E. Savannah M. Chicago u. Richmond
F. Charleston N. Detroit v. Norfolk
G. Birmingham o. Columbus W. Charlotte
H. Atlanta P. Cleveland X. Miami
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FIGURE 4
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAIL CONNECTIONS
E
A. New Orleans
B. Shreveport
C. Texarkana
D. Fort Smith
E. Kansas City
F. Dallas
G. Houston
13
FIGURE 5
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAIL CONNECTIONS
A. .New Orleans
B. Memphis
C. st. Louis
D. Chicago
E. Cairo
F . Birmingham
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FIGURE 6
NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAIL CONNECTIONS
A. New Orleans J. Richmond s. Kansas City
B. Birmingham K. Norfolk T. Louisville
C. Atlanta L. Washington
D. Memphis M. Pittsburgh
E. Jacksonville N. Cleveland
F. Savannah o. Buffalo
G. Charleston P. Detroit
H. Wilmington Q. Chicago
I. 'Ch a r l o t t e R. st. Louis
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FIGURE 7
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAIL CONNECTIONS
A. New Orleans I. Denver
B. Houston J. Wichita
C. San Antonio K. Kansas City
D. El Paso L. st. Louis
E. Los Angeles M. Little Rock
F. San Francisco N. Texarkana
G. Portland O. Dallas
H. Salt Lake City P. Amarillo
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FIGURE 8
UNION PACIFIC RAIL CONNECTIONS
A. New Orleans G. Los Angeles M. Kansas City
B. Houston H. San Francisco N. st. Louis
C. Brownsville r. Portland o. Chicago
D. Shreveport J. Seattle P. Memphis
E. Dallas K. Salt Lake City Q. Little Rock
F. EI Paso L. Denver R. Austin
S. Tulsa
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railroads move 350 trains through New Orleans each
week. 9
Between 1973 and 1978 the Port of New Orleans
led the Gulf Coast in new construction expendi-
tures (and was fourth nationally) amounting to a
total of $10,850,000. In proposed construction
for the period 1979 to 1983, the Port of New
Orleans actually led the entire nation with an
estimated $25,910,000; allocating more for spe-
cialized general cargo facilities and bulk cargo
facilities than any other port in the nation. 1 0
The Port is already preparing for the 21 s t
Century . A $187 million development plan calls
for the creation of three major terminals in an
upriver area of the port bounded by the Nashville
Avenue and Seventh Street wharves. The Public
Grain Elevator is being demolished and the land
redeveloped as part of one of the terminals. From
the current wharves will emerge the Nashville/
Napoleon Multipurpose Terminal, the Louisiana
Avenue Multipurpose Terminal and a heavy cargo
terminal, encompassing the present Harmony, Sev-
enth Street and First Street wharves, and it will
specialize in steel and forest products. In all,
3,937 feet of new wharf will be built and an add-
itional 40 acres of marshalling area in two yards
18
serving the new terminals will be added.
Administration
A seven member Board of Commissioners sets
all policies and makes major decisions concerning
the administration and operation of the Port. All
seven members are appointed by the Governor of
Louisiana. They serve five-year staggered terms
and receive no salary.
Daily operations and administration are exe-
cuted by a president assisted by five division
directors and a staff of marketing, planning and
engineering, and finance and administration pro-
fessionals. 11
19
CHAPTER III
THE PORT OF MOBILE
Geography
The Port of Mobile, Alabama sits approxim-
ately 130 miles east of New Orleans. Like its
larger neighbor to the west it has some of the
same advantages. It is centrally located in the
Gulf of Mexico and situated at the mouth of a
navigable river system (the Alabama and Warrior
Rivers) providing year-round service to and from
markets upriver.
However, the Alabama and Warrior River Sys-
tem does not extend beyond the State of Alabama.
In the past this was a major constraint to Mo-
bile's port development since transportation in
and out of its hinterland was dependent upon
trucking and rail services. Thus, Mobile's com-
petitiveness with New Orleans was limited to cer-
tain cargos generated by, or destined for, a small
geographical area. Simply put, the Inland Water-
way System put New Orleans directly in touch with
41 percent of the Continental United states; while
20
Mobile was restricted to providing its services to
a small portion of the South.
Development
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Port of
Mobile concentrated on developing its strengths.
While the Port of New Orleans was among the na-
tion's leading ports in expenditures in all types
of facilities (as discussed above), the Port of
Mobile was the nation's leading sea-port in ex-
penditures for dry bulk cargo facilities between
1973 and 1978. 1 2 Today, Mobile's McDuffie Terminal
bulk coal facility is the largest such facility on
the Gulf Coast and the second largest in the na-
tion with an annual throughput capacity of 23
million tons. 13
In 1985 the 234 mile long Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway, ·a controlled depth waterway, was opened.
As Figure 1 (p. 7) shows, the Port of Mobile was
connected to the Mississippi River System and be-
came an alternate outlet to the Gulf of Mexico for
cargo generated in the nation's midsection. The
importance and usefulness of this waterway was es-
tablished during the Drought of 1988 when the
United States experienced the worst dry spell
since the days of the Dust Bowl and the Missis-
sippi River fell to its lowest levels since re-
cords were first kept in 1872. Tennessee-
21
Tombigbee was unaffected by the lack of rainfall
and remained open as the only viable barge route
between the nation's interior and the Gulf of
Mexico. 1 4
The Port has aggressively sought out new cus-
tomer. A strong indication of the expansion being
experienced by the port is the difference between
Fiscal Year 1987 income and Fiscal Year 1988
income where losses for 1987 were $5,386,811 as
compared to the following year's losses of only
$206,395. 1 5
Port Description
Except for the McDuffie Terminal facility
which is three miles down river from the rest of
the port complex, the Port of Mobile is concen-
trated in a few square miles along the western
bank of the Mobile River. The Port offers almost
four miles of pier space. Up to 26 commercial
vessels can be accommodated at the Port's piers
and wharves. Listed in Table 2, these provide
2,322,7aO ·square feet of covered (shed) space as
well as 22 acres of container marshalling area.
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TABLE 2
THE PORT OF MOBILE
(CLASS A BERTHS)
Facility Frontage Area Capabilities
Marginal 894 ft L Containers
Wharf #2
Marginal 500 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf #3 30 ft W
Marginal 500 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf #4 30 ft W
Marginal 500 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Open area Containers
Wharf #5 30 ft W Vehicles
Marginal 500 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Shed Containers
Wharf #6 30 ft W
Marginal 500 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf #7 30 ft W
Marginal 637 ft L 100,000 ft 2 Shed General
Wharf #8 30 ft W
8A RO-RO
Pier A 570 ft L 120,000 ft 2 Shed Fish Meal
South 30 ft W
Pier A 350 ft L 17,500 ft 2 Shed General
River End
Pier A 1 ,496 ft L 153,000 ft 2 Shed General
North 42 ft W
Pier B 1 ,496 ft L 280,000 ft 2 Shed General
South 42 ft W
Pier B 622 ft L Containers
River End 30 ft W Vehicles
Pier B 1 ,600 ft L 280,000 ft 2 Shed General
North 42 ft W
23
TABLE 2
THE PORT OF MOBILE
(CLASS A BERTHS)
(CaNT)
Facility Frontage Area
Pier C 1,550 ft L 210,600 ft 2 Shed
South 42 ft W
Pier C 896 ft L
River End 70 ft W
Pier C 1,404 ft L 116,400 ft 2 Shed
North 42 ft W
Capabilities
General
Containers
Vehicles
General
Bulk
Public Grain
Elevator
-2 Ship Berths-
-2 Barge Berths-
-2 Truck Dumps-
-2 Rail Dumps-
New Berth
Bulk . 1,612 ft L
Material
Handling Plant
McDuffie Terminals
-2 Loading Berths-
-3 Barge Unloaders-
-2 rail car dumps-
3,200,000 bushel capacity
160,000 tons/hr
3,000 tons/hr to rail
7,000 tons/hr
3,000,000 tons storage
Grain
Grain
are
Coal
Coal
Notes: (1) The port has a 22 acre container mars2aling yard.
(2) The port has an additional 645,200 ft of covered
space.
(3) The port has an additional 192,200 ft 2 of open
storage.
Source: Port of Mobile
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During Fiscal Year 1988, 709 ocean-going gen-
eral cargo carriers, 146 ocean-going coal carriers
and 51 ocean-going bulk carriers berthed in Mo-
bile. A total of 75,750 rail cars, 3,132 barges,
and 45,513 trucks provided transportation into and
out of the hinterland. An additional 5,155 rail
cars, 18 barges and 3,037 trucks brought in
21,245,812 bushels of grain for export. 16
Like New Orleans (as seen in Figure 2, p.
11), Mobile has immediate access to Interstate 10
and Interstate 65 systems. Additionally, three of
the railroads that operate in and out of New Or-
leans also provide service for Mobile; CSX (Figure
3, p. 12), Illinois Central (Figure 5, p. 14), and
Norfolk Southern (Figure 6, p. 15). A fourth
railroad serving Mobile is the Burlington Northern
Railroad which provides similar coverage to Chi-
cago and the West Coast as that provided New Or-
leans by Union Pacific (Figure 8, p. 17).
Administration
The Port of Mobile is administered by the
Alabama State Docks Department. Created in 1928,
the Department is a State agency whose responsibi-
lity is promoting, developing, constructing, main-
taining and operating harbors, seaports and river-
ports within the State. Along with the Port of
Mobile there are ten inland ports administered by
25
the Department.
Daily operations and administration are exe-
cuted by a director and an assistant director as-
sisted by an executive staff of five division
directors and a staff of marketing, engineering,
finance, bulk operations and railway profession-
als.
26
CHAPTER IV
INTRODUCTION TO DEVELOPMENTAL PRESSURES
AND PROBLEMS
History and Growth
In just four short decades there has been a
revolutionary change in the manner cargo is ship-
ped by sea. In the recent past the traditional
method ~f ,s t o wi ng highly varied cargos by hand in-
volved low levels of overall productivity per man,
per gang, per berth. At the average cargo hand-
ling rate of 12-20 tons per gang-hour, ships were
forced to spend considerable amounts of time at
pier side. To minimize the time spent in port by
these labor-intensive operations, ships were kept
relatively small.
A rapid increase in labor and port costs in
the 1950s and 1960s resulted in the introduction
of more productive cargo-handling methods, such as
containerization, palletization along with im-
proved ship designs. Just two decades later
cargo-handling had evolved to the movement and
carriage of unit-loads of standardized dimensions,
neutralized characteristics, and weights appro-
priate for the maximum use of mechanical handling
27
equipment in which units of freight could, wher-
ever possible, move from origin to destination
without breaking of bUlk. 1?
The resultant rapid growth in the size of
cargo vessels since the end of World War II has
had a profound impact on sea ports; influencing
port channel depths, development of valuable and
scarce waterfront property, and, even, construc-
tion of offshore facilities.
Yet, deepening and widening the channels,
approaches, and anchorages at all major ports in
the United states would be both physically imprac-
ticable and financially prohibitive. Addition-
ally, even before the U.s. Congress enacted spe-
cific laws (see Table 3) designed to protect the
environment, environmental considerations in large
population centers had worked against the
introduction of deep-draft tankers, new refining
centers, ore smelters, and petrochemical comp-
lexes. The result is that, today, ports face dif-
ficult choices in terms of the environment,
safety, capital expenditures, and national defense
considerations. 18
Environmental Constraints
Heightened public involvement and environ-
mental regulations have allowed the most modest
28
TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF SELECTED U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
AND SAFETY LAWS RELATED TO PORTS
PROVISIONS
Act to Prevent
Pollution from
Ships
Marine Protection
Research and
Sanctuaries Act
(Ocean Dumping
Act)
Resource
Conservation
and Recovery
Act
and
treatment,
Comprehensive
Environmental
Response,
Compensation,
Liability
Act (CERCLA or
Superfund)
Implements the IMO International Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol
of 1978 (MARPOL 73/78). Provides for the
prevention of pollution from ships by the
discharge of harmful substances or efflu-
ents.
Regulates the disposal of materials at
sea, preventing or strictly limiting the
dumping of materials which would adverse-
ly affect the human health, welfare,
amenities or the marine environment, eco-
logical systems, or economic potential-
ities. Activities under this act are
also governed by the International Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pol-
lution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, 1972. (London Dumping Conven-
tion) .
Provides for cradle to grave management
of hazardous wastes by imposing manage-
ment requirements on generators and
transporters of hazardous materials
upon owners and operators of
storage, and disposal facilities. Prohi-
bits continued land disposal of hazardous
wastes unless the wastes meet specified
treatment standards.
Provides for liability, compensation,
cleanup, and emergency response for
hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste disposal sites.
29
SUMMARY
AND
Clean Air Act
Clean Water
Act
Ports and
Waterways
Safety Act
United
standards
TABLE 3
(CONT)
OF SELECTED U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
SAFETY LAWS RELATED TO PORTS
PROVISIONS
Protects and enhances the quality of the
Nation's air resources so as to promote
the public health and welfare and the
productive capacity of its population.
Restores and maintains the chemical, phy-
sical and biological integrity of the
Nation's waters. Provisions include fed-
eral effluent limitations and clean up of
spills in navigable waters.
Increases navigation and vessel safety,
protection of the marine environment, and
protection of life, property, and struc-
tures in, on, or immediately adjacent to
the navigable waters of the
States. Implements many IMO
concerning maritime safety under the In-
ternational Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74) and related
conventions, protocols, codes and resolu-
tions.
Source: Maritime Administration, Office of Port and
Intermodal
Development
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local interest group to halt a port project by
utilizing the legal process to involve a port in
complex and lengthy regulatory procedures.
The most prevalent single environmental issue
facing ports is the disposal of dredged materials
and contaminated sediments. There are fewer and
fewer sites available for disposal; upland sites
are scarce, wetlands are increasingly protected
from being filled, federal statutes limit open
water d~sposal, and ocean disposal sites are being
moved farther out to sea. The concern over con-
tamination has lead state and local environmental
agencies to demand sediment testing and monitoring
programs that can cost more than the dredging op-
erations themselves. 19
Public concern over wetlands conservation is
another problem for port development. While ports
need to maintain and proceed with needed develop-
ments, they must meet requirements to offset any
resulting loss of critical wetlands. 20
Another major problem for ports is the safe
and environmentally sound management of wastes
generated by vessels and port facilities. Marine
terminal and ship operators are concerned about
the potential economic impact of waste reception
facility regulatory requirements for oil, chem-
icals, and garbage under the Act to Prevent Pollu-
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tion from Ships. Principal concern centers upon
the provisions of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (CERCLA).
Competing Interests
The resurging interest in urban development
has regentrified the areas around the ports and
increased real estate values. Ports find them-
selves in competition with non-maritime commercial
interests for what little waterfront properties
are available. The pressure is now being applied
for ports to reduce the scope of their operations
or to relocate away from the returning popula-
tions. Both options are expensive and neither is
attractive . 21
Economic Pressure
First and foremost, commercial port develop-
ment has, is, and will continue to be dependent
upon ships their design, their shipping ser-
vices, and the perceived needs or preferences of
their owners. Additionally, global patterns of
trade and specific characteristics of the foreland
areas beyond the seas with which ports are linked
influence how and why certain ports receive more
develop~ent than do others. 22 Figure 9 displays
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FIGURE 9
SOME ELEMENTS IN PORT GEOGRAPHY
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Source: "Seaport Systems and Spatial Changes,", edited by
B.S. Hoyle and D. Hilling.
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those significant elements that impact on port
location and development. For the reasons cited
above, each port remains unique, each port complex
distinctive. 23
Containerships, themselves, are so expensive
to operate that economical operation precludes
calls at numerous ports. Profitable operations
demand the full exploitation of their high pro-
ductivi~y~ That productivity can only be in-
creased by reducing voyage time. Voyage time is a
function of speed at sea and time spent in port.
Speed at sea is essentially a design function
modified by such variables as sea-state, fuel
costs, etc. Time spent in port can be reduced by
making fewer port calls or by shortening turn-
around time. Fewer port calls, therefore, show
the greatest net savings of time by eliminating
additional sailing time, harbor transit and
maneuvering time, docking and undocking time,
support activity to prepare for cargo handling,
and rea~ying for sea required for each additional
port visit. 2 4 The extent of change as far as
ports are concerned is partially illustrated by
the comparison displayed in Figure 10.
Because of the capital-intensive nature of
containerization, it is more costly to construct a
34
TABLE 4
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF A PRE-CONTAINER REVOLUTION
BREAK-BULK CARGO LINER AND A POST-CONTAINER
REVOLUTION SECOND-GENERATION CONTAINERSHIP
Break-bulk
cargo liner
Antenor Class
1950-60
Second-generation
containership
Liverpool Bay
1972
Length 490 ft 807 ft
Cargo capacitY3 13,687 60,000
(tons of 40 ft ) (2450 TEU)
Approximate no. of 2.7 5.4
round trips per year
Annual capacit~ 74,000 648,000
(tons of 40 ft ) (27,000 TEU)
Tons handled per 1 ,000 19,000
working day in port
Total no. of discharging 28 6
and loading days per year
Source: Seaport Systems and Spatial Change.
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modern marine container terminal than a more
labor-intensive breakbulk facility. Whereas con-
ventional cargo handling was land-intensive, at
the most about 2.5 acres per berth, often with
multistorey transit sheds close to pier-side25 i a
containerized port terminal's facilities include
not only a wharf or pier with 10-20 acres of open,
hard surfacing, but also specialized handling
equipment such as container cranes, straddle car-
riers, portainers and other related terminal ser-
vice requirements. Included in the related ter-
minal service category are cargo consolidation/
distribution sheds and sizable back-up areas.
Figure 10 displays such a generic modern port.
Another problem has been the competitiveness
among ports, which often results in the duplica-
tion of ~xpensive facilities. Competition has
introduced new, efficient cargo handling systems
and operational procedures, and has provided in-
centives for port management to adapt to, and ad-
vance, technological progress. However, main-
taining a port's competitiveness involves large
investments in land and money that could well
result in wasteful competition and a dissipation
of resources by ports as they compete for busi-
ness. 26
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FIGURE 10
GENERIC CONTAINER SEAPORT
Source: "Seaports, An Introduction to Their Place and
Purpose," by L.G. Taylor.
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For example, the estimated construction costs of a
new container terminal with 900 linear feet of
berthing space, a 40-ton gantry crane and 20 acres
of paved back-up area range between $9-17 million
(in 1980 dollars).27
In the bulk trades the most spectacular trend
has been that of increasing ship size in response
to economies of scale over long hauls. Ultra
Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs) of over 500,000 dwt
are in operation with loaded drafts of over 90
feet, and for Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) in
the 250,000-300,000 dwt range, drafts of about 75
feet are usual. Dry-bulk carriers of over 200,000
dwt are in use but the average is probably nearer
100,000 dwt. In the 1950s both oil and dry-bulk
cargos were carried in vessels of a size close to
the average of the time, and were frequently found
in ports accommodating general cargo as well as
bulk trades. The increase in the size of these
vessels has produced a greater diversification
with respect to size and specialization and a wide
range of new port facilities has been created to
meet the increasingly rigorous demands of the new
trades -- Bantry Bay, Milford Haven, Antifer, Rot-
terdam Europort, and New Orleans LOOP for oil, and
ports such as Port Talbot, Port Hedland, and
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Tuburao for iron ore. 28
The end result is the concentration of cargo
and calls .a t a limited number of ports on a given
coast. Each port has been forced to make the de-
cision whether or not to supply, at high cost,
economical and efficient services to attract and
retain more traffic or to wait for a demand to
develop. In general ports go ahead and make the
necessary investments in anticipation of the
demand. The potential for inefficient allocation
of resources is great; the long life of port
structures ensures that any mistakes now made with
respect to technology or location will have long-
term implications for the geography of develop-
ment, could be costly in financial terms, and
possibly even counterproductive in overall devel-
opment terms 29, but the prevailing view has been
that competition is basic to the free enterprise
system and has led to the strong port system in
the United States. 30
A matter of major concern has been the dred-
ging and maintenance of adequate channels to han-
dle traffic demands. The federal government,
through its power to withhold or extend author-
ization and funding for channel projects, has the
capability to directly influence port development
and port use. Because funds are limited, there
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has been an inherent tendency to promote a selec-
tive policy towards those ports that appear to be
economically successful, to the detriment of mar-
ginal ports. 31
Another factor that will have a tremendous
impact on u.s. ports is the Water Resources Devel-
opment Act of 1986. The first authorization bill
enacted by Congress since 1970, this Act signifi-
cantly alters the roles, obligations, and oppor-
tunities for United states ports by requiring that
non-federal (local) interests assume proportion-
ately greater responsibility and share of the
costs of desired channel improvements and dredged
material disposal. This cost sharing is dependent
upon the type of project undertaken and can range
from zero percent up to 60 percent, under a gen-
eral guideline that requires local interests to
contribute a greater percentage as the overall
costs increase.
With respect to port improvements, this Act
allows the non-federal interests to levy port or
harbor dues to finance the non-federal share of
project costs for construction and certain opera-
tions and maintenance (O&M) costs associated with
deep-draft harbor projects. The non-federal share
of port O&M expenditures is financed by the impo-
sition of a new "harbor maintenance tax" on the
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value of domestic and international cargoes loaded
or unloaded at U.S. ports. This tax is equal to
0.04 percent of the cargo value (4 cents per $100)
and is paid by either the exporter, importer, or
carrier. The revenue received from this tax is
deposited in a Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. 32
In Fiscal Year 1988 this fund disbursed 148 mil-
lion dollars to the Corps of Engineers. 33
The 1986 Act also affects the Inland waterway
System by amending the 1978 law that required user
contribution to the construction of that system by
means of a fuel tax. Revenues from the tax are
paid into the Inland waterway Trust Fund and may
be drawn upon by the Corps of Engineers for up to
50 percent of the capital costs of a project only
after appropiation by the Congress for the pro-
ject. Beginning this year there will be an incre-
mental phase-in of an increase to the fuel tax to
20 cents per gallon (up from a current 10 cents)
by 1995. 34 In Fiscal Year 1988 the Corps of
Engineers received 58.8 million dollars from this
fund. 35
The Debate Over Port Development
Implicit in this discussion is the two-fold
question that has been the subject of much debate:
1) Should a public policy for ports be established
by the federal government that will determine the
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number, type, and location of ports in the United
states, or 2) should the principle of competition
and independence from federal involvement and con-
trol be the guiding factor?36 There is certainly
a school of thought that port planning is too im-
portant to be left to the ports, and that some
degree of wider co-ordination and possibly polit-
ical intervention is necessary.3? However, the
tradition of the U.S. port industry is that gen-
eral port planning, financing and construction of
marine terminals as well as efforts for increasing
operating capability and efficiency are all mat-
ters to be determined at the individual port or
the state level. 38
Ports in larger population centers are be-
coming increasingly involved with social consid-
erations. Water pollution, recreational use of
waterfront land, threats to wildlife and fish-
eries, redevelopment of waterside areas, rapid
transit, freeway systems, and urban renewal all
impinge on port development and demand attention.
The conflicting demands may require new multistate
or intrastate agencies to deal with jurisdic-
tional, political, and financial problems of
local, state, and national authority and responsi-
bility.39 In any event, the challenge to port de-
velopment is considerable: to rethink the ways in
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which ports should be built, to create new or mod-
ified forms of coastal settlements, to provide
better environments for people living and working
in maritime zones and to provide new stimuli for
regions and nations within which industrial ports
are set. 40
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Chapter V
ECONOMICS OF PORT DEVELOPMENT
The Effects
It is imperative to remember that ports have
a significant impact on the economies of the ci-
ties, states and regions in which they are loca-
ted. First, the production or processing of
goods, especially agricultural products, is not
all carried out within the limited confines of any
port. A port may be a robust manufacturing cen-
ter, but it can not survive without the inflow and
outflow of commerce generated by the much vaster
hinterland it serves. During the Industrial Revo-
lution in Massachusetts ports grew substantially
due to the flow of manufactured goods; however,
the actual manufacturing centers like Lowell
developed around areas where power was obtainable
for the factories. The ports benefitted from the
increased flow of trade, not from their own manu-
facturing capabilities; ports that could serve the
vital interests of the industrialized centers
waxed while those that could not waned. Today it
is easy to picture ports like New York, New
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Orleans, and Los Angeles as funnels serving
industrial areas far outside their metropolitan
limits.
Second, available transhipment capability can
quickly attract other functions. Cities along the
Inland waterway System attracted the railroads be-
cause of their connectivity to the ocean shipping
lanes. The railroads, in turn, brought in other
industries and interests. Cities like Pittsburgh,
Cincinnatti, st Louis, Memphis, Kansas City and
Louisville grew because of their land and water
ties. The modern era has introduced aviation,
another link in the transportation chain which
brings more benefits to those communities that
already have water and land connections.
Third, the influence of the port, as well as
the influences affecting it, can be identified
over wider areas beyond the port limits. "Banned
in Boston" would have meant little without the
influence .brought about by the economic wealth
generated within the seaport.
Fourth, the relationships between the port
and the transport links to and from it will be
affected by technical developments in maintaining
these links. As discussed in the previous chap-
ter, not every port benefits from technological
advancements. The economies of scale that demand
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larger and larger ships can result in ports being
cut out of a particular trade because of draft
limitations that can not be successfully dealt
with.
Fifth, the development of the port will be
affected by the development of other ports. Com-
petitiveness on the part of a seaport requires
compatability with the capabilities of other ports
involved in the same trades. Failure to adapt can
result in carriers bypassing a port in favor of
others better suited to their needs.
Sixth, the development of the port will be
subject to the politico-economic influence of the
national territory and economic grouping of states
in which it is located. Or, more simply, the rich
get richer much faster than the poorer do.
Seventh, growth of the port and decay within
the port area may pose environmental problems. 41
There is no clearer example than New Bedford,
Massachusetts for an examination of the deadly
fruits of some technological advancements. New
Bedford typifies the small, decaying seaport suf-
fering ~hrough a region-wide recession that is
faced with the problem of dealing with a poisoned
environment.
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Costs and Benefits
The U.S. port industry, in 1972, handled over
1.6 bil~iqn tons of cargo, generated over $30 bil-
lion in direct dollar income, provided jobs for
over 1 .2 million people, and contributed over $1.1
billion to the balance of payments account. 42
Sixteen years later, in 1988, those same act-
ivities generated an equal number of jobs (1.2
million), $98 billion in direct dollar income, and
$50 billion to the gross national product. In ad-
dition, with 70 percent of U.S. Customs revenues
coming from import duties generated at the ports,
over $13 billion was earned for the federal trea-
sury.43
To .h~ndle the huge tonnages involved in the
country's waterborne commerce, the port industry
invested over $3.2 billion in facilities from 1966
to 1973. 44 In 1974 the Maritime Administration
estimated that U.S. port capital expenditures from
1973 to 1977 would be about $1.5 billion. 45
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The Gulf Coast
Between 1973 and 1977 Gulf Coast expenditures
were estimated to account for 34 percent of the
total cited above; with the following breakdown:
Conventional General Cargo - 8% of national
total
Specialized General Cargo - 8% of national
total
Liquid and Dry Bulk 84% of ~gtional
total.
Between 1973 and 1978 u.S. public ports act-
ually allocated over $1 .6 billion for construction
and modernization of commercial shiphandling faci-
lities. This figure represents about 36 percent
of the total amount spent on public ports since
1946 and is due primarily to the increasingly
capital-intensive nature of modern port facil-
ities. 47
Between January 1973 and December 1978 a
total of $626,765,000 in port development funds
were allocated to Gulf Coast ports. That figure is
38 percent of the grand total spent overall; no
other area of the country allocated nearly as much
(the next closest area was the Pacific Coast with
20 percent of the grand total). But a good way to
show the growing importance of the Gulf Coast is
to examine the six year period from 1973 to 1978.
While that period comprised only 15.6 percent of
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the time since 1946, those capital expenditures
account for 53 percent of the total capital out-
lays in the Gulf region during that 33 year per-
iod. 48For the five year period from 1979 to 1983
it was estimated that $3,371,556,000 would be
spent nationally on U.S. ports. Of that amount
the Gulf Coast was expected to receive 58 percent,
or $1,958,456,000. 49 Significantly, 96 percent
of those expenditures were destined for new con-
struction vice maintanence and repair. 50
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS OF PORT DEVELOPMENT
The Reasons For Change
Since World War II, many changes have been
made in the basic physical and operational pattern
of port facilities and their locations, rendering
most of the general cargo piers obsolete in both
location and design and creating demands for new
facilities and new locations. At the same time,
new forms of port organization and management have
become necessary.51
Ports, especially commercial and diversified
ports, create a multiplier effect. They set in
motion a chain of economic activities that, in
turn, creates demands for commercial and indus-
trial establishments dependent upon and related to
maritime commerce. In turn, these demands create
further needs for land for residential, recrea-
tional, and service uses required by the popula-
tion deriving its support from those port-based
activitie~.52
As the locations for a port's terminals be-
came obsolete, new waterfront and landward areas
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for terminals and associated facilities had to
be absorbed closer to the urban periphery. Gen-
erally, p~w ports tend to be located seaward of
the older clusters, partly because of the deeper
channels required by the larger ships and partly
to reduce transit time between the terminals and
open water. 53
The tremendous increase in capacity and cargo
handling speed of containerships represents a
significant increase in prospective cargo flow
through the port. The need for increased capacity
has resulted in a demand for more land adjacent to
the port terminals, for mechanization of the term-
inals themselves, for better landward connections
by rail .and highway, for deeper, wider, and
straighter approach channels, and for marginal
wharves to replace centrally located but obsolete
finger piers in some ports. Furthermore, to jus-
tify large investments in channels, land, sophis-
ticated and expensive cargo handling equipment,
while the ship owners were demanding maximum effi-
cient use of their assets, it became necessary to
concentrate traffic in relatively few but highly
efficient ports (load centers). Because of their
efficiency, these load centers could attract traf-
fic from ever-widening hinterlands and forelands
and from less competitive ports on the same and
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other coasts. 54
In terms of scale economies, the container-
ships have their landward counterparts in con-
tainer trains, unit trains, and semi-trailer and
"double bottom" trucks operating on express high-
ways.55
Containerships cannot economically serve
ports that do not offer very substantial volumes
of cargo and that do not permit rapid turnaround.
Consequently, some of the most important routes
are served by a limited number of ports; in some
instances only one at each end. 56
The rapid move to containerization of cargo
has made a high proportion of conventional break-
bulk ships, carrying miscellaneous general-cargo
as discrete items, obsolete. Since containerships
are much faster, turn around in port much more
quickly,. and are substantially larger than the
break-bulk vessels, one containership may effec-
tively replace four or five conventional ves-
sels. 57
Replacement of smaller conventional break-
bulk ships by containerships has produced notable
effects on the physical patterns of the ports they
serve, changing the emphasis from providing piers
to that of providing upland areas for marshalling
containers. The advantages of high speed and
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large capacity would be largely lost if turnaround
time in port were not very much less than for
break-bulk ships. Fewer ships that spend less
time in port need less total contact area between
water and land in the ports, since the need to
accommodate large numbers of ships at berth is
reduced. 58
There is a greatly increased need for land
adjacen~ ~o the berths. A typical berth for a
containership, involving from 700 to 900 lineal
feet of wharf, requires at least 20 to 30 acres of
contiguous level land for the sorting and handling
of containers, while ideal conditions might call
for as many as 50 acres per berth. Obviously,
these extensive tracts of land are not generally
available adjacent to the waterfronts in or near
the central parts of port cities. 59
With the barge-carrying ships, inland ports
along the river systems -- the Mississippi system
in North America and the extensive waterways of
Western .Eur~pe, for example -- are provided with
break-bulk, or unitized, cargo service directly
overseas. GO
As in the case of dry bulk, the petroleum
terminals, both crude and product, are almost
entirely privately owned and operated. Conse-
quently, public port facilities are not generally
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a consideration. However, providing channels with
adequate depth for the large tankers involves a
complex of public policy issues. 61
The Influence on the Hinterland
Since construction began to replace World War
II era commercial vessels, economies of scale
forced the building of larger and larger ships.
Both for liquid and dry bulk commodities, the
increase in ship size and the consequent savings
in transportation costs have been spectacular.
Complementing those revolutionary changes, land
transportation of goods also underwent significant
technological change through the following:
- Completion of the Interstate Highway
System and analogous systems in other
countries;
- Development of long-distance trucking
and pipelines;
- Growth of inland waterway transportation
in the United States and Western Europe;
- Establishment of COFC (container on
flat-car) and TOFC (trailer on flatcar),
or "piggyback," to take advantage of scale
economies in water and rail transportation
over long distances and the flexibility
of the truck; and
- Development of barge-carrying ships
combining inla~d wa~2r transportation
and ocean carr~age.
Developmental Considerations
These developments created a need for effi-
cient planning and operation at the interfaces
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between the different modes to ensure the fast
turn around of ships, which produce no economic
return while they are loading and discharging. As
the efficiency and speed of movement between term-
inals improved, the need for comparable efficien-
cies in the operation of terminals increased. 6 3
Technological changes in transportation, together
with large costs for the "hardware" of modern
transportation systems and the need for effective
utilization of the transport plant and labor
force, dictated the necessity for developing
efficient ports. 64
All these developments pointed to the need
for a re-examination of the traditional policies
and practices of port development and operation at
national, regional, and local levels. Added to
these forces were the problems related to the en-
vironment, the energy crisis, a new social aware-
ness, and urban decay.
Simply put, ports cannot be planned, devel-
oped and operated independently of the regions on
which they depend for traffic and for which they
serve as gateways. They also cannot be considered
independently of their relations to their immed-
iate vicinities because of their effects on em-
ployment and the local economic base. In addi-
tion, demands for land - particularly shore land
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with deep water access, an increasingly scarce
resource - commonly involve the ports in competi-
tion with other land uses.
What was once true for seaports in this
country no longer applies. During the early
stages of economic development there was likely
close symbiotic relationships between particular
ports and their home regions. With time and the
extension and improvement of transport links the
hinterlands were enlarged and became more complex
in character. Initially well defined, even dis-
crete, port hinterlands became blurred as each
port and region generated its own momentum and as
competitive forces created intervening opportun-
ities and new possibilities for linkages. 65
The United states has never had a national
port plan, and no commercial port or group of
ports has ever been under complete control of the
national government. The port industry, histor-
ically, has been decentralized. Individual ports
compete with each other for the available traf-
fic. This competition reflects the American
traditions of free enterprise and local control.
At the same time, the ports of the United states
have received from federal agencies many benefits
directly related to their development and opera-
tion. The navigable rivers and harbors, with very
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few exceptions, are maintained and improved under
congressional authorization by the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers. In no other nation is the improve-
ment and maintenance of navigable channels within
harbors a central concern of the national govern-
ment while the building and operation of terminal
facilities remains a decentralized local con-
cern. 6 6
Port Development on the Gulf Coast
In "t he beginning each port developed its own
connections with its hinterland, first by road and
inland waterway, later by canals and railroads.
Because of the difficulties of inland trans-
portation, the hinterlands of the various coastal
ports rarely overlapped. 67
On the Gulf Coast, railroad penetration into
the interior came somewhat later than on the At-
lantic Seaboard, primarily because the Mississippi
River system furnished easy waterway transporta-
tion. The Civil War, however, interrupted North-
South river traffic, and led to increasing impor-
tance of the railroads. New Orleans, on the Mis-
sissippi Delta, dominated the North-South trade
and was the major port for the Gulf of Mexico.
However, with the decline of steamboat traffic on
the rivers, New Orleans relied increasingly upon
its railroad connections between st. Louis and
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Chicago. Other Gulf ports such as Tampa, Gulf-
port, Mobile, and Port Arthur, although without
major inland waterway routes to the interior, were
in large measure developed by particular rail-
roads. 68
Railroad penetration from both the Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts in the overlapping Midwestern
hinterland during the latter half of the nine-
teenth century brought all of the Atlantic and
Gulf ports into competition. 69
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CHAPTER VI
ISSUES CONCERNING PORT DEVELOPMENT
Ports have developed competitively throughout
our national history, largely with private capital
and under private control. In recent years there
has been an increasing trend toward control and
operation of the terminal facilities by local pub-
lic bodies, mainly states and municipalities, or
bodies created by them. 70
A major institutional issue, and perhaps the
most complex and troublesome one, is the extent to
which port planning and development should be done
on a regional or national basis. Subsumed within
that question is the need for comprehensive stu-
dies of port requirements. The American Associa-
tion of Port Authorities, representing the public
port industry, has traditionally held that ports
are competitive, that competition is in the public
interest, and that any prospect of nationwide re-
search on port requirements, whether conducted by
the federal government or not, could lead to na-
tional port planning. 71
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Arguments for the study of the port require-
ments of the United states are strong. The hin-
terlands of the individual ports are no longer
mutually exclusive but overlap, so that extensive
areas of the United states are served by more than
one port, commonly by several ports or even ranges
of ports on different coasts. 7 2
The federal interest in ports is complex.
Navigable channels are a federal responsibility,
and many millions of dollars are spent each year
in the discharge of that responsibility. Several
questions bear on this subject: 1) To what extent
are such expenditures justified in enabling a po-
tentially obsolete port to remain in competition?
2) Will there be sufficient traffic for many such
ports in view of the trend toward concentration?
3) Are expenditures for channel construction and
maintenance discriminatory?73
One argument against national determination
of port requirements is that each port has unique
attributes. New Orleans, for example, has an eas-
ily accessible and extensive natural hinterland in
the Mississippi Basin but poor natural site condi-
tions, with silting and flooding requiring con-
stant dredging. 7 4
Each port body and private interest involved
in port development and operation, it is argued,
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should take its own risks and should make its de-
cisions on the basis of the knowledge that it gen-
erates or that is made available to it.?5 The
argument against centralization of port studies is
based on the fear that such studies would lead to
national port planning and eventually federal con-
trol. This would reduce the freedom of action of
those ports with inherent disadvantages that are
willing to apply local initiative and investment
in return for the benefits of the multiplier ef-
fect on the local and regional economy.?6 Oppo-
nents of central planning feel there is no cer-
tainty that national port planning will lead to an
improvement in the nation's port industry, partic-
ularly when economic, political, and social condi-
tions are changing so rapidly, both internation-
ally and domestically. Development of a national
port plan could remove some of the flexibility
ports now have to adjust to varying conditions.??
Completely local or regional determination of
port investment could result in excessive unused
capacity if each port competes for the same traf-
fic. Some unused capacity may be beneficial, de-
sirable or undesirable. There are strong argu-
ments for unused capacity. One is that it pro-
vides a choice for the shipper, ship operator, and
land carrier. Ports would compete on a cost basis
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and on their ability to give good service. Compe-
tition with the better ports ultimately getting
the most traffic, is held by many to be a desir-
able condition, even at the expense of investment
in facilities used at less than capacity. A se-
cond argument in favor of unused capacity is that
provision must be made for all peaks, but even
though cargo berths may be unused for substantial
periods, this does not mean they are not needed.
A high load factor - ratio of use to available
capacity - may divert traffic from a port or may
produce intolerable delays during peak periods. A
possible result is substantial investments by in-
dividual ports that would not be justified by the
traffic that could be diverted from other ports. 78
Throughout much of the nineteenth century and
in the early twentieth century, the navigable wa-
terways and harbors were, as they continue to be,
a federal responsibility. Port facilities have
traditionally been a private or local responsibil-
ity. In virtually no other major maritime nation
is there the dichotomy between federal responsi-
bility for channels and local responsibility for
ports that exists in the United states and that
underscores the current controversy over the pros-
pective role of the federal government in port de-
velopment. 79 Significantly, there is no evidence
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that ports in other countries where such complete
control exists have developed any more efficiently
than those in the United States. 8 0
Fo~lqwing the port congestion of World War I,
the Port of New York Authority (now the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey) was organ-
ized to simplify the transfer and movement of
port-related cargo and passenger traffic within
the metropolitan port district. It was the first
public interstate port agency, established by bi-
state compact and approved by the U.S. Congress. S 1
During recent decades the special-purpose
port authority has become increasingly cornmon. In
many instances, the definition of "port" has been
stretched to include many ancillary and some unre-
lated activities. Port authorities, in addition
to operating port terminals and port-oriented
railroad switching facilities, may operate air-
ports, transit lines, convention and exhibition
halls, bridges, tunnels, and office buildings. 8 2
The underlying basis for the trend toward
public port development and operation is the
public benefit. A public agency can ensure that
all prospective users able to benefit from the
port facilities have access to them on equitable
terms and can bear the high costs of capital fi-
nancing. Port facilities rarely produce suffi-
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cient income to amortize increasingly large in-
vestments; they commonly do not even cover the
out-of-pocket costs. Many of the benefits and
some of the costs are "external" and benefit the
community as a whole. Therefore, the community is
justified in assuming some of the port costs in
return for tangible and intangible benefits. 8 3
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
Before reaching a conclusion about the most
advantageous relationship between the ports of New
Orleans and Mobile one needs to consider two other
elements; the other ports in the Gulf of Mexico
region and significant natural occurrences.
Ports in the Gulf Region
Overall, no ports in any other region of the
nation entered the final two decades of the Twen-
tieth Century as ready for growth as the U. S.
ports along the Gulf of Mexico. Port development
expenditures discussed in Chapter V compared the
Gulf region as a whole to the rest of the nation
and showed the emphasis placed upon improving and
increasing the capacity of those ports. As Table
4 shows, by 1980 the facilities offered by ports
along the Gulf were in much better condition,
overall,' than the ports in any other region. Be-
sides New Orleans and Mobile, Houston, Galveston,
Corpus Christi, Tampa and Pascagoula had devoted
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TABLE 5
PHYSICAL CONDITION OF FACILITIES BY REGION
Region Good Fair Poor Not recorded
North Atlantic 59% 27% 8% 6%
South Atlantic 61 26 12 1
Gulf 75 16 8 1
South Pacific 54 28 16 2
North Pacific 55 24 19 2
Great Lakes 44 47 8 1
National Average 58% 29% 11 % 2%
Good - Weakest part of the facility is above average in
its ability to fulfill its designed function.
Fair - Weakest part of the facility is adequate in its
ability to fulfill its designed function.
Poor - Weakest part of the facility is marginal in its
ab~l~ty to fulfill its designed function.
Source: u.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime
Administration, 1980.
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considerable resources to upgrading their facil-
ities to keep up with the changing requirements of
shippers. 84
An additional advantage enjoyed by the Gulf
region ports was the larger number of deeper draft
berths available for the larger vessels entering
into the ocean-going trades. A comparison of
Table 5 (Predicted Vessel Size by 1990) with
Table 6 (Berthing Depth Distribution by Region)
clearly shows that the major ports along the Gulf
Coast are poised to handle greater numbers of
deep-draft vessels than their competitors on the
other coasts.
These factors, combined with the superb tran-
sportation infrastructure in the South and the
rapidly increasing populations in the Sunbelt, led
the u.S. Department of Commerce to conclude that:
" ... the Gulf coast regions is expected to
experience significant tonnage growth in
all ... cargo categories, with the most dra-
matic growth occurring in the area of for-
eign trade ... general cargo ... will signia~­
cantly increase on a percentage basis."
Therefore, competiton has been keen among the
Gulf ports. However, while the Port of New Or-
leans provides facilities for all varieties of
trade, other ports have concentrated on devel-
oping their individuals strengths. Houston
handles almost twice as much containerized cargo
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TABLE 6
PREDICTED VESSEL SIZE BY THE YEAR 1990
LARGEST VESSEL IN THE WORLD FLEET
VESSEL TYPE
Capacity Length Beam Draft
(000) (ft) (ft) (ft)
Breakbulk 27 dwt 598 82 37
Partial Containership 30+ dwt 668 89 40
Containership 40+ dwat 943 106 42
Barge Carr i .er 45 dwt 879 103 38
Dry Bulk Carrier 150 dwt 1,000 144 56
Combination Carrier 200 dwt 1,076 164 63
LNG 65 dwt 936 144 36
Tanker 550 dwt 1 ,315 207 93
AVERAGE EXPECTED VESSEL SIZE
VESSEL TYPE
Capacity Length Beam Draft
(000) (ft) (ft) (ft)
Breakbulk 13 dwt 500 69 30
Partial Containership 13 dwt 509 75 31
Containership 18 dwt 657 89 32
Barge Carri.er 40 dwt 876 103 38
Dry Bulk Carrier 35 dwt 660 83 37
Combination Carrier 100 dwt 852 111 46
LNG 60 dwt 932 141 36
Tanker 40 dwt 671 78 37
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TABLE 7
BERTHING DEPTH DISTRIBUTION BY REGION
Range of Water Depths at Berthing Facilities Total
Coast No. of
26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 >55 Berths
North
Atlantic 141 367 82 2 592
South
Atlantic 86 99 54 239
Gulf 111 166 179 33 13 3 505
South
Pacific 45 247 71 16 9 10 6 404
North
Pacific 77 140 85 25 8 5 340
Great
Lakes 257 1 258
Total 717 1020 471 74 32 13 1 1 2338
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Port Assessment
1980-1990, June 1980.
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as does New Orleans, and Mobile's McDuffie Ter-
minal, discussed in Chapter III, has a yearly
throughput equal to, or greater than, the tonnage
shipped from New Orleans.
For Calendar Year 1987, eight of the top
twenty-five ports, measured both by total tonnage
and total value, handled in foreign trades were
Gulf ports. 8 6 There clearly is enough trade for
everyone to pursue.
It is evident that the Port of New Orleans
has one main advantage -- the Mississippi River.
However, the river is subject to natural events
that can play havoc with trade. Lower Missis-
sippi River barge traffic was severely disrupted
in the ~u~er of 1988 and cargos normally shipped
out through the Port of New Orleans were diverted
through the ports of Mobile, Chicago, Duluth-
Superior, and Milwaukee.
The Lower Mississippi River is also subject
to the other extreme of nature - flooding. As
shown in Table 7, major floods occur at frequent
intervals. These floods not only affect shipping,
they can also cause significant damage to the phy-
sical infrastructure along the river.
Over the past 5000 years the Mississippi
River Delta has changed seven times as the River
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TABLE 8
MAJOR FLOODS SINCE 1879 ON THE
LOWER MISSISSIPPI RIVER
Year Interval Years
1882
10
1892
11
1903
9
1912
1
1913
3
1916
6
1922
5
1927
2
1929
8
1937
8
1945
5
1950
23
1973
2
1975
4
1979
4
1973
Source:, The Mississippi River Commission, An American Epic,
Mississippi River Commission, u.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Vicksbrurg, U.S. Corps of Engineers, 1989.
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found new routes into the Gulf of Mexico. The
portion of River that flows from Old River,
Louisiana (just north of Baton Rouge) to New
Orleans is maintained today only through the Low
Sill and Overbank Structures constructed at Old
River in the late 1940s by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to prevent the River from shifting its
channel to the Atchafalaya River. Had the River
shifted, New Orleans would have been left 70 miles
east of "t h e new main river channel. 8 7
The massive flooding of 1973 sent a wall of
water down river that came close to overwhelming
the manmade barriers at Old River. Although a new
Auxiliary Structure was added to the defences at
Old River in 1987, the River can never be consi-
dered a complacent presence.
In contrast to New Orleans, Mobile can rely
upon the depth-controlled Tennessee-Tombigbee
waterway for access to the nation's midsection.
As was shown in 1988, Mobile can benefit when
conditions on the Mississippi slows trade through
New Orleans.
Both ports have successfully responded to the
pressures generated by modern shipping techno-
logy. The infrastructure of each, from piers ide
facilities to rail and road access, is designed
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to effect the fastest possible offload and onload
of cargq . .
Endowed with naturally deep shipping chan-
nels the ports attract all but the deepest draft
vessels in the world. Where New Orleans con-
structed the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP) to
better handle the biggest of the supertankers,
Mobile initiated a dredging program designed to
give the largest of the coal colliers access to
the McDuffie Terminal; once again showing the
emphasis on building upon their strengths.
The two ports are environmentally attuned,
also. The Mississippi River Delta is the nation's
largest,. while the Mobile Delta is the second lar-
gest. Dredged material from the two systems is
being used to construct additional wetlands in
their respective delta systems. Both entities are
working at becoming contributors to the difficult
solutions and taking the necessary actions to min-
imize the problems.
Now to answer the question of combining the
planning and operations of the ports under one
supervisory agency. Although the ports are in two
different states 130 miles apart, it would only
require a political agreement between the two
states to create a management agency for the oper-
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ations of both ports, but to what end.
Today the ports are competitive, not only
with each other, but with the other ports along
the Gulf. They have expended the resources neces-
sary to achieve their developmental goals, and, as
has been discussed, each port has defined its
goals mindful of the cargos and markets most
suited to its trade relationship with the common
hinterland and its overseas markets.
A significant percentage, if not a majority,
of the expenditures allocated for development are
derived from public funding. It is doubtful that
the citizens of one state would appreciate their
tax dollars being spent on port development out-
side of the state, yet, differences in land
prices, wages, and materials would bar any pos-
siblity of balanced spending between the two
ports.
The concern about an over-duplication of
facilities seems unfounded. Yes, both ports offer
similar facilities; however, today's shipping re-
quirements and modern technologies dictate what a
port must provide to remain competitive. All
ports now offer similar facilities, some more
modest and some considerably larger.
Additionally, specialized cargo handling
facilities common to the two ports reflect the
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commercial requirements of the hinterland both
ports serve. It is these specific cargos
(grains, ores, coals, etc.) that require abundant
facilities throughout ports serving the nation's
midsection since natural events such as drought
and floods can cause significant perturbations in
their transportation flow.
Regional port authorities, both bistate and
intrastate, have been created in areas throughout
the United states and are functioning well. The
primary intent of their creation has been to im-
prove efficiency and/or create a more competitive
environment for their ports. As has been dis-
cussed in the preceding pages, the Ports Authori-
ties of Mobile and New Orleans have successfully
provided the leadership and foresight necessary to
maintain the competitiveness of their respective
ports. In addition, while the two ports continue
to be involved in direct competition for certain
cargoes between themselves, as well as with other
regional ports, they have also successfully iden-
tified themselves as preeminent ports for parti-
cular cargoes. In this way they have avoided the
need to tie the two ports together.
Competition between the ports is the engine
that drives the planning, financing and construc-
tion designed to attract trade. The successful
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ports along the Gulf Coast, among them New Orleans
and Mobile, have invested and planned wisely and
are reaping the fruits of their efforts over the
last two decades. These efforts have been on an
individual basis and there is no compelling reason
to believe that any cooperative effort between
ports would improve upon their efficient opera-
tions or make them more competitive with other
ports serving the same hinterland. Therefore, the
hypothesis that the creation of a regional port
authority, combining and controlling the opera-
tions and future development of the two ports,
would be more beneficial than an all out com-
petitive effort resulting in wasteful and ex-
pensive duplication of facilities cannot be
supported.
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